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Introduction 
In the aftermath of the Ukrainian revolution in Kiev, the Russian Federation, according to the 
European Union, illegally annexed the south eastern province of Crimea. The EU imposed 
‘smart-sanctions’ on businessmen, politicians and several financial institutions from the 
Russian Federation (Rijksoverheid, 2015). Russia retaliated in August 2014 with a ban on the 
lion’s share of agricultural imports from the EU, the US and Australia (Wall Street Journal, 
2014). When a state has decided to impose economic sanctions on another state, it has a 
number of options. It can impose trade sanctions, like import or export sanctions, it can 
impose so-called smart-sanctions, or it can impose different types of financial sanctions. 
When choosing the type of sanction to employ it must determine which type might be the 
most effective. Effectiveness in this sense is achieving the policy change that is desired by 
the sender at the lowest cost for the sending state. For the EU the most effective sanctions 
apparently were relatively limited smart-sanctions while Russia chose comprehensive import 
sanctions on agricultural commodities as retaliation.  
What the most effective sanction type is, has received relatively little attention among 
scholars, notwithstanding that factors like sanction type and the severity of sanctions are 
adjustable to the sanction situation at hand. The type and severity of sanctions are factors 
open for adjustment by policy makers, while other factors are exogenously determined like: 
the relative economic size of both states, trade linkages, the salience of the policy change 
that is being sought and the likeliness of a certain sanction being busted by third parties. 
Particularly sanction busters can have a devastating impact on the effectiveness of sanctions 
(Hufbauer et al., 2007: 8; Early, 2015: 218-219). Some types of sanctions might be more 
likely to be busted than others and therefore this thesis will also devote attention to the 
likeliness that particular sanctions are being busted. 
The research questions of this thesis are: does the type of sanction imposed by the sender 
state influence the level of costs for the target state? Does the level of costs then influence 
the change at success of sanctions, such that one could conclude that the type of sanctions 
at least indirectly influences success? In connection hereof, are certain types of sanctions 
more likely to be busted?  
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Figure 2. Export sanctions 
Theoretical framework 
Sanction type 
The broadest distinction of sanction type 
is between trade sanctions and financial 
sanctions. Trade sanctions can further be 
subdivided into import sanctions and 
export sanctions. The terms export or 
import in this thesis are used in the same 
way as Hufbauer et al., meaning that  
the episode is viewed from the perspective of the sender country (2007: 91-92). One’s state 
exports is always someone else’s imports and the other way round. That is the reason that in 
this thesis the situation is always seen from the perspective of the sender state. This will 
help to keep the way sanctions are directed unambiguous.  
Import sanctions are the complete or partial obstruction of trade from the target state to the 
sender state, see figure 1. An example is the current Russian import boycott of food from the 
European Union (Wall Street Journal, 2014). Russia imposed these sanctions and the episode 
is thus seen from a Russian perspective. For the target country this means losing an export 
market and probably lower prices for the embargoed exports (Hufbauer et al., 2007: 45). In 
the case of the Russian import boycott this means that European food exporters have to 
look for new markets and expect lower prices for their exported goods.   
It follows logically that export sanctions are the complete or partial obstruction of trade 
from the sender state to the target state, see figure 2. A famous case of export sanctions is 
US President Carter’s boycott of grain shipments from the US to the USSR in 1980 and 1981 
(Hufbauer et al., 2007: 29). For the target state this means the denial of critical imports and 
higher prices paid for substitutes (Hufbauer et al., 2007: 45). The Soviet Union had to find 
new grain imports. Argentina and the European Economic Community increased grain 
exports to the USSR following the US grain embargo (Paarlberg, 1980).  
Figure 1. Import sanctions 
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The last type of sanction is financial sanctions, which can be broken down in several 
subclasses, such as prohibition of commercial finance, ending or pausing bilateral aid, 
freezing or seizure of assets within the sender’s control, or the complete lockout of a state 
from the international monetary system, as happened in the case of Iran several years ago 
(Hufbauer et al., 2007: 47). In this thesis there will not be a distinction between these 
different subclasses of financial sanctions. 
Sanction type: trade sanctions 
Different sanction types can influence the outcome of sanction episodes (Hufbauer et al., 
2007: 170). Although it is known that sanction type does influence sanction outcome, the 
reasons why it does, are not well understood. The most recent attempt to explain the 
different effects of import and export sanctions was in 1988, when Kaempfer and Lowenberg 
developed a theory of economic sanctions using public choice theory. They argued that it is 
more likely that sender states impose import restrictions than exports restrictions (Kaempfer 
& Lowenberg, 1988: 787). Their main line of reasoning is that the dominant interest groups 
in a country can influence government policy best. Producers are smaller in number than 
consumers and are therefore in general a more cohesive and politically effective interest 
group (Kaempfer & Lowenberg, 1988: 790). Imposing import sanctions does benefit 
domestic commercial constituents, because they are better off with fewer imports from 
abroad, which means less competition and thus higher domestic prices, also see appendix 1. 
This may benefit domestic producers but at the same time it will hurt domestic consumers. 
When commercial interests in the sender state are indeed dominant, as Kaempfer and 
Lowenberg argue, then this implies that it is more likely that the sender will impose import 
sanctions rather than export sanctions.  
H1: Import sanctions are used more often than export sanctions. 
The relevance of sanction cost 
Economic sanctions inflict a certain cost to the target state. The basic theory of why costs are 
a relevant factor is that it is expected that economic sanctions impose a certain cost on the 
constituencies within a country who in turn demand their leaders to adhere to the policy 
change of the sender (Early, 2015: 32). Economic sanctions impose a cost on the target state 
because trade or capital flows are interrupted and this leads to higher costs for the target 
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state. The primary reason is that lost trade has to be replaced by more expensive imports 
from and/or cheaper exports to other countries, the target thus experiences diminished 
terms of trade (Hufbauer et al., 2007: 101). See Appendix 1 for more on the economic theory 
behind trade sanctions in the target state. Not only do replacement goods have a relatively 
high price, it also takes time before new trade partners are found, new contracts are 
negotiated and goods or capital arrive. This all happens under increased uncertainty for the 
new trade partners (Early, 2015: 33). This uncertainty originates from the heightened risk of 
bankruptcy of the target state and also because of the risk that the trade partner may be 
punished by the primary sender for busting the sanctions (Early, 2015: 33).  
The sender’s goal is often targeted at the government, yet the effect of sanctions mainly hits 
its constituents, while the government apparatus seems not directly affected by trade 
sanctions. However, a government always feels the economic situation in the country and 
sees tax revenues decline. Governments from developing states will feel sanctions in 
another way as well, because import and export tariffs constitute a substantial amount of 
government income (IMF, 2004: 8-9). Decreased amounts of trade then directly result in 
lower tax revenues. Trade sanctions thus can have severe financial repercussions for 
targeted governments. 
Financial sanctions and sanction cost 
Hufbauer et al. showed with a simple cross tabulation that financial sanctions, when used as 
the only policy tool, are the most effective type of economic sanction (2007: 46-64). It has 
been found that financial sanctions are not very effective in cases with destabilization as 
sanction goal, but that for all other goals financial sanctions do in fact play a significant role 
(Dashti-Gibson et al., 1997: 613-614). According to Hufbauer et al. the reasons that financial 
sanctions are more successful are multiple (2007: 46-48). First, financial sanctions not only 
hit the target state financially they also limit the possibilities for trade, because trade 
depends on the access to finance. Second, financial markets are often better regulated than 
goods markets, making it easier to impose the sanctions and prevent evasion by domestic 
constituents. Third, financial sanctions directly influence government income and capital 
streams in the target state, in contrast to trade sanctions that mainly bring higher costs to 
the civilian population through higher prices or lower profits for commercial constituents 
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through lower prices (Hufbauer et al., 2007: 97). Finally, when financial sanctions involve the 
disruption of foreign assistance it is much easier to impose the sanctions unilaterally. From 
the perspective of the sender state these advantages make financial sanctions sound as the 
panacea of economic sanctions. If financial sanctions are indeed easier to enforce, harder to 
evade and have a direct impact on a government’s budget (Hufbauer et al., 2007: 47), this 
should also make them costlier than trade sanctions.   
H2: Financial sanctions impose higher costs on the target state than trade sanctions. 
Trade sanctions and sanction cost 
Although financial sanctions are frequently used, trade sanctions are used even more often 
(Hufbauer et al., 2007: 170). Hufbauer et al. see import sanctions as more effective than 
export sanctions for the reason that it deprives the target country of foreign currency and 
thus at the same time works as a kind of financial sanction (2007: 47). Having little foreign 
currency may also lead to the inability to buy foreign goods (Hufbauer et al., 2007: 47). This 
then must mean that import sanctions come with a higher cost for the target state. On the 
other hand the opposite argument can be made for the sending state when it concerns 
export sanctions. First it is important to note that the cost to the sender will be much less 
than the cost to the target as the sender country is often a much larger economy (Hufbauer 
et al., 2007: 109). Hufbauer et al. also argue that the cost of sanctions, primarily export 
sanctions can fall heavily on just a few domestic firms. This is the reason that Kaempfer and 
Lowenberg argue that firms in the sending state will lobby for the imposition of import 
sanctions instead of export sanctions, exactly because it comes with higher costs for 
commercial constituents in the sending state (1999: 38).  
H3a: Import sanctions impose higher costs on the target state than export sanctions.  
H3b: Export sanctions brings higher costs to the sender state than import sanctions. 
Research so far has shown that higher costs for the target lead to more successful sanctions 
(Lam, 1990; Dehejia & Wood, 1992; Dashti-Gibson et al., 1997: 608-609; Morgan & 
Schwebach, 1997: 46-48; Lam, 2000; Hufbauer et al., 2007: 55, 168-171), while higher costs 
for the sender lead to less successful sanctions (Hufbauer et al., 2007: 189; Lam 1990). If 
hypotheses 3a and 3b are supported, so that import sanctions are indeed costlier to the 
target state than export sanctions, and less costly for the sender than export sanctions, then 
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this must also mean that import sanctions are correlated with more successful sanction 
episodes in general.   
H4: Import sanctions lead more often to successful sanctions than export sanctions.  
Although from an theoretical perspective the previous discussion about the most effective 
sanction type makes sense, in reality there are some complicating factors. The first is that 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which is nowadays part of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), has legal constraints for import barriers, but almost none for 
export barriers (Leidy, 1989: 1300). Because import sanctions are in conflict with the free 
trade principle of the WTO, it is more controversial to impose import sanctions than export 
sanctions. Secondly, the powers of the US president have been restricted when it comes to 
the imposition of import restrictions, making it harder to impose import sanctions than 
export sanctions (Leidy, 1989: 1301; Hufbauer et al., 2007: 45). This is especially relevant 
because the US is one of the most active users of economic sanctions (Hufbauer et al., 2007: 
10-13). A last reason is that it is much harder to reverse import restrictions, because of the 
price shock this will bring to domestic producers in the sender state itself (Leidy, 1989: 1302). 
When sanctions are lifted, the foreign competitors will re-enter the market, potentially 
pushing the producers in the sending state out of business. These arguments do not so much 
attack Kaempfer and Lowenberg’s public choice theory internally, but it might explain why 
import sanctions may not be used more often than export sanctions as is expected by their 
theory.   
Bringing all components together 
The previous hypotheses already assume a connection between sanction success and the 
cost that an economic sanctions imposes. Sanction type can be a variable that directly 
influences sanction success but it is more likely that sanction type is an antecedent variable 
influencing target cost. Target cost then should influence the likeliness that a sanction ends 
in success. Target cost is in fact one of the best established factors determining sanction 
success (Lam, 1990; Dehejia & Wood, 1992; Dashti-Gibson et al., 1997: 608-609; Morgan & 
Schwebach, 1997: 46-48; Lam, 2000; Hufbauer et al., 2007: 55, 168-171). The previous 
discussion leads us to expect that sanction type will influence the cost perceived by the 
target and thus indirectly change at success. The effect of sanction type on sanction success 
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has however not yet been established when target cost is also part of the analysis.   
H5: Target cost is the intervening variable between sanction type and sanction success.  
Sanction busters 
If sanction type influences cost and it is indeed true that cost is central in determining 
sanction success, than the factors that heavily influence target cost deserve attention as well. 
When sanction busters can mitigate the costs imposed on the target to tolerable levels, an 
important effect of the initial sanctions is lost (Early, 2011: 383). This makes sanction busters 
a potentially important factor as they can undermine economic sanctions. Understanding 
this is important, because different types of sanctions are likely to cause different reactions 
from third parties. Research directed at sanction busters is relatively new and still rather 
scarce in the economic sanction literature. Hufbauer et al. focussed on so-called black 
knights; third-party states that replace lost trade or capital to the target country, where 
black knights are defined as: “powerful or wealthy allies of the target country” (Hufbauer et 
al., 2007: 8). Although they present black knights as one of the main reasons that sanctions 
theoretically lead to failure, their empirical analysis does not support this assumption 
(Hufbauer et al., 2007: 198). The concept of sanction busters is further developed by Early, 
who argues that the black knights definition of Hufbauer et al. is heavily influenced by Cold-
War rivalry. The Cold War created an atmosphere where the two powers were willing to 
help targeted states without necessarily profiting economically from this. The most famous 
example is the case of Cuba (Early, 2015: 162-188). Early argues that there is much more 
commercial sanction busting going on instead of allies that are willing to help without 
profiting (Early, 2015: 20; Early, 2011: 392). Early hence uses a broader definition of sanction 
busters: “third-party states that respond to the imposition of sanctions by increasing their 
economic engagement with target states in ways that ameliorate the sanctions’ adverse 
consequences” (2015: 21). Early argues that trade-based sanction busters are primarily 
profit-driven (2015: 22).  
When a sender imposes export sanctions, this means that the target state loses a part of its 
imports, thus leaving a gap for other exporting countries to fill unless the target state can do 
without those products or can produce substitutes. Drury argues that black knights are only 
willing to replace lost imports, in other words: to bust the export sanctions (1998: 505). It is 
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likely that the busting state is willing to sell goods to the target, because it is an opportunity 
to profit. Meanwhile the busting state is not willing to open up its own market to the target’s 
exports because that leads to increased competition for its domestic producers (Drury, 1998: 
506). If there is a profit to be made it is likely that several states are interested and thus we 
expect that export sanctions have more sanction busters than import sanctions.  
H6: Export sanctions have more sanction busters than import sanctions.   
Early investigated the economic incentives of trading with a sanctioned state in his 2009 and 
2011 articles (Early, 2009: 54). In 2011 Early defined sanction busters as “(…) third party 
states that respond to a sender’s sanctions by significantly increasing their trade with the 
target state and in high enough absolute levels to substitute for the trade losses entailed by 
the sanctions.” (2011: 390). This means that also in cases where the primary or only sanction 
was financial, Early still looks for third countries that increased their trade with the target 
country. It is doubtful whether this measure is appropriate for target states that only face 
financial sanctions and not trade sanctions.  
Financial sanctions often deprive the target state of foreign currency and therefore should 
make trade with third countries harder (Hufbauer et al., 2007: 46). Also financial markets 
have become much more regulated at the international level than the goods markets 
(Hufbauer et al., 2007: 46-47). This should make it easier to prevent sanction busting of 
financial sanctions or at least be aware of its existence. It is thus rather unlikely that trade 
will increase significantly with financial sanctions, let alone that easy profits can be made 
from a country hit by financial sanctions. Altogether it is likely that trade busting has more 
impact on trade sanctions than on financial sanctions.  
H7: Pure financial sanctions have fewer trade sanction busters than trade sanctions.  
 
10 
 
Data and methodology  
The dataset 
In order to make the statistical inferences that are needed to test the hypotheses as 
presented in the previous part we need data. Fortunately previous authors on economic 
sanctions have collected data, like Hufbauer et al. who created the HSEO database in 1983 
and updated it most recently in 2007, now containing 204 sanction cases (Hufbauer et al., 
2007: X). Early also created a dataset for his articles in 2009 and 2011 on sanction busters. 
Early took 97 cases from the HSEO dataset, in which the USA was the sender. It is not clear 
what the basis of this selection is, because the HSEO dataset contains 123 cases in which the 
USA is the primary sender and another 10 in which the USA is the secondary sender. Early 
only mentions that the pre-1950 cases are left out (2011: 390). The reason might be that for 
the earlier cases the trade data was not available, this is however, not explicitly stated by 
Early. The 2011 dataset contains US sanction cases over time, so that every year a sanction 
persists in stalemate is represented by a separate case. This results in a dataset with 1150 
cases that is based on 97 separate sanction episodes (Early, 2011: 382). In order to test the 
last two hypotheses presented in the theoretical framework of this thesis, the two datasets 
have to be combined. The HSEO dataset by Hufbauer et al. (2007), is merged with the 
sanction busting dataset created by Early (2011). This is possible because the dataset by 
Early is also based on the HSE dataset and thus has the same unique case coding.  
Because not all hypotheses do need the trade sanction buster data compiled by Early, we 
will test only the last hypotheses with the combined HSEO-Early dataset. The original HSEO 
dataset contains 204 unique sanction episodes, versus the 97 USA-sanction episodes 
collected by Early. To prevent a bias with the USA as sender and to be able to make 
generalizations it is preferred to use the HSEO dataset for the other hypotheses.  
Operationalization 
Sanction success is used in the same manner as Hufbauer et al. do, meaning that the 
variables policy success and sanction contribution, which are both categorical variables 
ranging from one to four are multiplied in order to create the variable sanction success 
(Hufbauer et al., 2007: 49-52). The variable sanction success can thus take the value of 1 till 
16. Policy success measures whether the sender’s goals have been achieved and sanction 
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contribution measures the extent to which the economic sanction has contributed to that 
outcome. In our analyses, sanction success is used as a dichotomous variable. So when can 
we speak of sanction success? A sanction episode is defined a success when the sender’s 
goals were at least partly realized and when the economic sanctions substantially 
contributed to this outcome. This means that both policy success and sanction contribution 
have a minimum value of three out of four (Hufbauer et al., 2007: 48-50). Sanction success is 
then perceived as a success when their product is 9 or larger. This is the same 
operationalization as used by Hufbauer et al., 2007; Early, 2009; Dashti-Gibson et al., 1997. 
Target cost and sender cost are both part of the HSEO dataset. Sender cost is a categorical 
variable or as Hufbauer et al. call it “a judgemental index, scaled from 1 to 4, to measure the 
economic and political pain endured by the sender country” (2007: 64), where 1 is a net gain 
to the sender and 4 is a major loss to the sender (Hufbauer et al., 2007: 63-64). The authors 
call it judgemental index, because it is not based on a fixed calculation or formula but it is 
assessment made by the authors based on “the trade, financial, and political costs incurred 
by the sender” (Hufbauer et al., 2007: 63-64). The cost to the target is calculated on the 
basis of predicted welfare loss and the elasticity of demand and supply. The result is 
expressed in the percentage lost GNP of the target country (Hufbauer et al., 2007: 62). In the 
original HSEO dataset the cost to the sender and the cost to the target are thus coded 
differently and that makes them incomparable. In order to enhance the comparability 
between sender cost and target cost, the variable target cost has been recoded into a 
categorical four-point scale, just like the sender cost variable.  
Cost to target as percentage of GNP has been recoded in a categorical variable with four 
values. The categorization has been adapted to match the variable sender cost as much as 
possible and also has a distribution over the four categories that looks like the distribution of 
sender cost, with the majority of cases in the two middle categories, see table 1. As 
Hufbauer et al., already observed the numbers seem small, with a majority of the cases that 
have target costs below 2% of GNP (2007: 105). The total coded cases add up to 94.7% 
because not all target costs are coded in the original HSEO dataset. With the recoding into a 
categorical variable some information is lost. This new measure will therefore only be used 
when it serves a purpose, for example when target cost and sender cost are compared. 
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Table 1. Recode: Target cost as categorical variable  
Label: Range in the original variable: Recoded into:  Percent 
No loss or insignificant loss -∞ through 0.09 1 21.6 
Minor loss 0.10 through 1.49 2 37.3 
Modest loss 1.50 through 4.99 3 22.1 
Major loss 5.00 through +∞ 4 13.7 
Total   94.7 
 
The HSEO dataset has one variable with multiple codings. For the purpose of this thesis this 
variable is recoded into dummy variables as can be seen in table 2. In the HSEO dataset only 
six sanction episodes consist of import sanctions and only 22 are export sanctions. Import 
and export sanctions are more often combined with financial sanctions. Because it is 
expected that the effect of import and export sanctions should also be observable when 
they are combined with financial sanctions, a new variable is created that takes together 
import plus financial import sanctions and export plus financial export sanctions. This means 
that the variable broad import sanctions is coded by counting the import sanctions and the 
financial import sanctions in table 2 and the variable broad export sanctions is created by 
combining the variable export sanctions and the variable financial export sanctions. This 
leads to a slightly larger number of observations of import and export sanctions which is 
helpful in the further statistical analysis. This operationalization is borrowed from Hufbauer 
et al. (2007: 91). As long as the new variables are not used to make inferences about the 
difference between financial and import or export sanctions, this measure seems 
appropriate.  
Lastly a new variable has been created that takes together all trade sanctions. This variable 
combines import sanctions and export sanctions in order to obtain the variable trade 
sanctions in table 2. This is necessary in order to be able to test hypothesis 6, which 
compares the number of sanction busters in financial cases versus sanction busters in trade 
cases.  
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Table 2. Frequency table: Sanction type 
     Label Frequency Percent 
  Financial sanctions 53 26.0 
 Import sanctions 6 2.9 
 Financial import sanctions 10 4.9 
 Broad import sanctions 16 7.8 
 Export sanctions 22 10.8 
 Financial  export sanctions 28 13.7 
 Broad export sanctions  50 24.5 
 Export and import sanctions 12 5.9 
 Trade sanctions 40 19.6 
  Broad sanctions 62 30.4 
 
Early measures the presence of sanction busters by looking at hikes in international trade 
data. In Early’s article sanction busters are defined as “(…) third party states that respond to 
a sender’s sanctions by significantly increasing their trade with the target state and in high 
enough absolute levels to substitute for the trade losses entailed by the sanctions.” (2011: 
390). This is operationalized by a count measure of the number of third party states that 
increased their imports or exports with at least 5% compared to the previous year and are 
responsible for at least 5% of the total trade with the target country. This way only extensive 
sanction busters are counted. As a final step the three-year running averages are taken 
instead of yearly numbers of sanction busters, which is justified by the lag that trade data 
has compared to actual yearly trade (Early, 2011: 391). This leads to a continuous variable 
with zero as minimum value, meaning that not a single third state has increased its trade 
significantly with the target country since the imposition of the economic sanctions. Table 3 
provides the summary statistics for the sanction busters’ variable.  
Table 3. Summary statistics of the sanction busters’ variable 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Deviation 
Sanction busters 1150 3.24 1.65 
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Results and discussion 
Hypothesis 1 
Import sanctions seem not to be used more often than export sanctions as table 4 shows. 
Even when the broader measure of import and export sanctions is used, it becomes clear 
that export sanctions are used in 50 cases and thus much more often than import sanctions 
in only 16 cases. Unlike Kaempfer and Lowenberg would predict, export sanctions are the 
more popular trade sanction. The hypothesis is therefore rejected.         
Table 4. Frequency table: Import vs export sanctions 
    Label Frequency Percent 
  Import sanctions 6 2.9 
 Financial & import sanctions 10 4.9 
 Broad import sanctions 16 7.8 
 Export sanctions 22 10.8 
 Financial & export sanctions 28 13.7 
 Broad export sanctions  50 24.5 
 
This result could mean that commercial constituents are not the dominant interest group, or 
at least that they are not able to influence the design of sanctions. As was discussed in the 
theoretical framework, there are several other factors that can explain the limited use of 
import sanctions, like the GATT rules favouring export sanctions. These factors do not 
necessarily contradict the theory of Kaempfer and Lowenberg, but at least show that more is 
happening than the theory predicted. Another reason export sanctions are used more is that 
export sanctions are used in a specific type of sanction case: the military impairment case. In 
these cases senders often put in place a very specific export boycott that limit the export of 
strategic weapons, like nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction and military 
technology (Hufbauer et al., 2007: 70-72). Even though the commercial constituents in the 
senders’ state will not be in favour of export sanctions, the political interests of preventing 
the target state of acquiring certain weapons are more important. Indeed 14 out of 29 cases 
within the military impairment category are export sanctions while none are import 
sanctions, see table 5. This means that the different sanction goals might partly explain 
another outcome than Kaempfer and Lowenberg had expected. Yet, even if the 14 export-
oriented cases are disregarded or subtracted from the total of 50 export sanctions, 36 export 
sanction episodes remain, a number well above the 16 import sanctions. All together, it thus 
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remains true that export sanctions are used more often than import sanctions and the 
hypothesis is rejected.  
Table 5. Export and import sanctions split out to policy goal 
Foreign policy goal 
Broad export 
sanctions 
Broad import 
sanctions 
Other 
sanction type 
Total 
Modest goal 
Regime change 
Disrupt military adventure 
Military impairment cases 
Other major policy changes 
 10 10 23 43 
 9 5 66 80 
 8 0 11 19 
 14 0 15 29 
 9 1 23 33 
Total 50 16 138 204 
 
Hypothesis 2 
The second hypothesis states that financial sanctions impose higher costs on the target than 
trade sanctions. This is tested with an independent samples t-test with target cost as the test 
variable while sanction type is disaggregated in financial sanctions and trade sanctions. This 
is the variable of which the means are compared to each other in table 6. With a mean of 
0.73 for trade sanctions verses 1.76 for financial sanctions the target cost is significantly 
different. Financial sanctions indeed impose higher costs on the target state and therefore 
the hypothesis is supported. Hufbauer et al. thus seem to be correct with their analysis that 
trade sanctions impose lower costs on the target state than financial sanctions. 
Table 6. Independent samples t-test 
  N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
t df Sig.  Std. Error 
Difference 
Target cost Trade sanctions 40 0.73 0.22 -2.34 91 0.021 0.44 
Financial sanctions 53 1.76 0.34 
Two-tailed tests. 
 
Hypothesis 3 
In order to test hypothesis 3a target costs are compared for the sanction type. It is expected 
that import sanctions impose higher costs on the target state than export sanctions. 
Although the number of observations is small, we do see in table 7 that export sanctions are 
distributed at the lower end of the ‘loss-spectrum’, with 88% of the cases with values that 
signify no loss or only a minor loss compared to 69% of import sanctions. The differences are 
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even bigger in the major loss category with only 2% of the export sanction versus 19% of the 
import sanctions in this category. The chi-square shows that there is indeed a statistically 
significant association between target cost and sanction type.  
Table 7. Cross tabulation of target cost and import/export sanctions (percentages) 
 Broad export 
sanctions 
Broad import 
sanctions 
All other sanctions 
Target cost 
(categorical) 
 No loss 40 44 13 
 Minor loss 48 25 38 
 Modest loss 10 13 30 
Major loss 2 19 19 
 Total % 100 100 100 
 N 50 16 127* 
Chi-Square = 30.63; p=0.00 (*target cost is not coded for 11 ‘other sanction’ cases) 
Hypothesis 3b is tested by crosstabulating sender cost against sanction type and it is 
expected that in this case export sanctions lead to higher costs. Table 8 shows that neither 
export sanctions nor import sanctions lead to major losses for the sender state. Import 
sanctions do always impose some cost although 94% of the cases lead only to a minor loss 
compared to 72% of export sanctions. The results are clearly mixed even though the chi-
square shows that there is association between sender cost and sanction type, it is by no 
means clear that export sanctions do indeed impose higher costs on the sender state. 
Hypothesis 3b is therefore rejected.  
Table 8. Cross tabulation of sender cost and import/export sanctions (percentages) 
 Broad export 
sanctions 
Broad import 
sanctions 
All other sanctions 
Sender cost 
(categorical) 
 No loss 16 0 40 
 Minor loss 72 94 35 
 Modest loss 12 6 19 
Major loss 0 0 6 
 Total % 100 100 100 
 N 50 16 138 
Chi-Square = 36,34; p=0,00 
A possible explanation for this result is that the financial component of the import and 
export variables, diffuse the results or even influence them. A replication of hypothesis 3a 
and 3b with pure import and export sanctions instead of broad import and export sanctions, 
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however, showed that the results did not in fact alter that much and had no effect on the 
conclusion.  
 
Hypothesis 4 
Although hypotheses 3b cannot be supported, it is still worth testing whether import 
sanctions are more successful than export sanctions. Using a dichotomous measure for 
sanction success, 31% of import sanctions lead to successful outcomes versus 20% of the 
export sanctions. The results do indeed indicate that import sanctions tend to lead more 
often to success than export sanctions. The difference in cost, as was tested in hypotheses 
3a and 3b, is thus likely to be correlated to sanction success.  
Table 9. Cross tabulation of sanction success and import/export sanctions (percentages) 
 Broad export sanctions Broad import sanctions 
Sanction 
success 
Failure   80 69 
Success   20 31 
 Total %  100 100 
 N  50 16 
Chi-Square = 6.49; p=0.04 
Hypothesis 5 
As the answer to the previous hypothesis already suggests, there should be a relationship 
between sanction type, target cost and sanction success. 
The only logical relation is when sanction success and 
sanction type have sanction cost as intervening variable. 
This will be tested by running three separate binary logistic 
analyses in which the dichotomous variable sanction 
success is the dependent variable. Target cost and sanction 
type are alternately added in the first and second analysis. 
Target cost and sanction type are both added in the third 
analysis. When the direct relation between sanction type 
and sanction success (a) is larger than the relation between 
them when cost is also part of the logistic analysis (b), so that 𝑎 > 𝑏, it is shows that target 
cost is the intervening variable, see figure 3. At the same time the coefficients between 
target cost and sanction success in the second and third analysis should more or less stay the 
same, so that 𝑐 ≅ 𝑑 in figure 3. Sanction type has been entered as in most of the analyses in 
Figure 3 
18 
 
this study, meaning that the variables are dichotomous and consists of: financial sanctions, 
broad import sanctions, broad export sanctions and broad sanctions. Broad sanctions consist 
of export, import and financial sanctions at the same time.  
Table 10 shows sanction type coded as financial, import, export and broad sanctions versus 
the dependent variable: sanction success. All coefficients have negative signs, meaning that 
the dependent and independent variables are negatively related. If any type of sanction is 
included then the odds that the sanction will result in a success decreases. Only export 
sanctions reach significance and it also has the highest negative coefficient.  
Table 10. Logistic regression: Sanction type 
 B   S.E.  Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
 Financial sanctions -0.495 0.506 0.956 0.328 0.610 
Import sanctions -0.701 0.682 1.058 0.304 0.496 
Export sanctions -1.299 0.547 5.641 0.018** 0.273 
Broad sanctions -0.305 0.491 0.386 0.535 0.737 
Constant -0.087 0.417 0.043 0.835 0.917 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, two-tailed tests.  
Pseudo R-square: 0.038 (Cox & Snell) 
When the variable target cost as a percentage of GNP is added to the logistic regression, we 
observe some changes. None of the variables is significant anymore, while all coefficients of 
the entered variables have become positive. The absolute values of the coefficients of 
sanction type have become higher in the second logistic analysis as can be observed in table 
11. This does not match the conditions for target cost as intervening variable between 
sanction type and sanction success and runs against the assumption that was presented in 
the theoretical framework. This result also contradicts the results found under hypothesis 3a, 
where a relation between import/export sanctions and target cost was found.  
Table 11. Logistic regression: Sanction type and target cost 
     B  S.E.  Wald  Sig.  Exp(B) 
 Financial sanctions 1.021 0.826 1.527 0.217 2.775 
Import sanctions 0.835 0.944 0.781 0.377 2.304 
Export sanctions 0.248 0.852 0.085 0.771 1.281 
Broad sanctions 1.091 0.826 1.746 0.186 2.978 
Target cost (% of GNP) 0.026 0.025 1.117 0.291 1.026 
Constant -1.649 0.776 4.519 0.034** 0.192 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, two-tailed tests.  
Pseudo R-square: 0.043 (Cox & Snell) 
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In the last logistic regression in table 12, we observe that the variable target cost alone also 
does not reach significance. The variable target cost does indeed remain in the same order 
of magnitude, shifting from 0.026 to 0.040. This does not immediately violate assumption 
𝑐 ≅ 𝑑 from figure 3.  
Table 12. Logistic regression: Target cost 
  B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
 Target cost (% of GNP) 0.040 0.024 20.699 0.100 1.041 
Constant -0.890 0.171 26.964 0.000*** 0.411 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, two-tailed tests.  
Pseudo R-square: 0.016 (Cox & Snell) 
These surprising results cannot confirm that sanction cost is the intervening variable 
between sanction type and sanction success. This raises the question whether there might 
be another intervening variable at play. It is also possible that the dataset itself is not giving  
correct results, because it is hard to comprehend how it is possible that whatever sanction 
type is added in the analysis the odds of success decrease.    
Hypothesis 6 
Even though the previous hypothesis is not confirmed and target cost could not be shown to 
the variable connecting sanction type and sanction success, it remains likely that sanction 
busters can have a significant effect on sanction success through sanction type. In order to 
test the sixth hypothesis, the number of sanction busters is tested for broad import 
sanctions and for broad export sanctions. In total 274 cases of the 1150 are export sanctions, 
while 98 are import sanctions. An independent t-test establishes whether the means of 
sanction busters are significantly different for import and export sanctions. As can be seen in 
table 13, the mean number of sanction busters in import sanctions is substantially higher 
than the number of sanction busters when export sanctions are imposed. The mean entails 
the average number of sanction busters over all import and export cases. For import 
sanctions this average number of sanction busters is with 3.93 higher than for export 
sanctions where it is only 3.46. So on average there are more sanction busters active when 
the target country is confronted with import sanctions. The t-test in table 13 shows us that 
the difference is indeed significant. This result is, however, the complete opposite of the 
stated hypothesis where it was expected that export sanctions were more likely to attract a 
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high number of sanction busters. A targeted state confronted with import sanctions at that 
moment needs imports that originally came from the sender state. The numbers do, 
however, show the opposite and seem to indicate that third parties are more willing to buy 
the goods that the targeted state exports. This could be the case because these goods are 
probably available at a discount as the theory in appendix 1 predicts. Another explanation 
for this could be that the measure developed by Early, the number of sanction busters, does 
in fact not accurately measure sanction busting. The variable is a count variable, meaning 
that every sanction buster is counted as one, no matter whether it increased its trade with 
exactly 5% or with 50%. Therefore, the number of trade partners may have increased, but 
that does not mean that the total amount of trade has increased. It is possible that this 
influences the result obtained here. A variable containing absolute trade changes would be a 
more accurate measure to be tested. From the perspective of the sender it is thus preferred 
to impose export sanctions if they do not want their sanctions to be busted.  
Table 13. Independent samples t-test  
  N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
t df Sig. Std. Error 
Difference 
All Busters Broad export 
sanctions 
274 3.46 0.07 -2.91 370 0.004 0.16 
Broad import 
sanctions 
98 3.93 0.18 
Two-tailed tests. 
 
Hypothesis 7 
The number of sanction busters is tested for both trade sanctions and financial sanctions. 
From the 1150 cases, 242 cases are purely financial sanctions and 87 are purely trade 
sanctions. The variable trade sanction is a combination of cases where only import sanctions, 
only export sanctions or both import and export sanctions are being used. Table 14 shows 
that trade sanctions have more trade sanction busters than financial sanctions and the 
difference is significant. These results confirm the hypothesis that trade sanctions have a 
higher number of sanction busters. Although this result was expected, the question remains 
whether financial sanctions can be busted by third parties that increase imports or exports 
to or from the target country. It would make more sense to develop a variable that takes 
capital flows into account, instead of just looking at hikes in international trade data, as Early 
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does in the dataset for his 2009 and 2011 articles. If financial sanctions cannot be busted by 
increasing trade, the number of sanction busters in the case of financial sanctions should be 
zero. However, with a mean of 3.32 it is not zero at all. This consequently raises the question 
sanction busters is properly operationalized. It could for example be that all countries, 
sanctioned or not, have major shifts in their yearly trade partners.  
Table 14. Independent samples t-test  
  N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
t df Sig.  Std. Error 
Difference 
All Busters Trade sanctions 87 3.90 1.02 3.57 327 0.000 0.16 
Financial sanctions 242 3.32 1.40 
Two-tailed tests. 
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Conclusion 
This study has shown that import and export sanctions are used relatively little compared to 
financial sanctions and that import and export sanctions do not significantly influence the 
costs as perceived by the sender. The type of sanction does have a significant impact on the 
target cost. This casts doubt about the theoretical model as presented by Kaempfer and 
Lowenberg (Kaempfer & Lowenberg, 1988; 2007). Either domestic commercial constituents 
in the sender state are not the influential interest groups Kaempfer and Lowenberg expect 
them to be, or this cannot be properly measured with the analyses we have done. It still 
could be true that commercial constituents are able to influence the domestic design of 
sanctions, but not to the extent that they can apply them to their own advantage i.e. bend 
them all to import sanctions. In particular export sanctions can be rather sector-specific and 
impose heavy losses on narrow commercial constituents (Hufbauer et al., 2007: 109). 
Commercial constituents might understand and accept the political reality that sanctions are 
going to be imposed and still be able to divert the most negative outcome and be able to 
prevent the creation of export sanctions. Although this is hard to test, because this would 
necessitate a measure of influence and that is beyond the scope of this thesis. It has also 
been demonstrated that financial sanctions impose much higher costs to targets than trade 
sanctions, although this is likely to be primarily true for poorer countries and less so for 
more developed states.  
That sanction type seems to matter also becomes clear in the result that export sanctions, 
compared to import sanctions, lead to higher costs for the target state. At the same time 
export sanctions relate to more successful sanction episodes, oddly enough this relation 
disappears when target cost is added as a variable in the logistic analysis. Another finding is 
that import sanctions attract, on average, more sanction busters than export sanctions. A 
higher number of sanction busters is, according to Early, supposed to decrease sanction 
success. This conclusion is supported by the findings in this thesis and it strengthens the 
argument for the use of export sanctions instead of import sanctions.  
There is still no empirical support for target cost as the intervening variable between 
sanction type and sanction success. Although it is accepted among scholars that sanction 
type can be a relevant factor in determining sanction success, sanction type remains too 
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little understood and there is a need for more thorough analysis on the role of sanction type 
in economic sanction in order to close the existing knowledge gap in the sanctions literature. 
There is also a need to include more different types of sanctions in the HSEO dataset, like 
smart sanctions and further subdivisions of financial sanctions like the impediment of aid 
flows or asset freezes.  
Early truly has provided us with a deeper insight in the presence of sanction busters and 
their motivations. Although it remains a mystery why financial sanctions would be ‘busted’ 
when third parties increase trade with the target state (Early, 2011: 388-389). A better 
operationalization of sanction busting that measures the amount of trade that is busted 
instead of the number of sanction busters would help to measure the real effect of third 
party sanction busting on sanction success. Additional research on this point could lead to 
interesting findings and enhance our understanding on the role that is played by sanction 
busters and the role that sanction type plays in attracting black knights.  
Sanction type is one of the few factors policymakers in the sending state wield control over 
and this thesis showed that sanction type can affect the costs for the target and can affect 
the likeliness that third parties will bust the sanction. All this stresses the relevance of proper 
sanction design by the sending state in order to achieve the foreign policy goal that is being 
sought in the most efficient way.  
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Appendix 1 
Economic theory behind the effect of trade sanctions in a target country 
The economy of a target country can be illustrated as a supply-and-demand curve and looks 
like figure 4. On the horizontal axis is the quantity demanded and supplied and on the 
vertical axis is the price per unit of any good, also called the ‘composite good’. The lines 
Supply and Demand in figure 4 show the goods supplied and demanded in the target country 
in the pre-sanctions period.  
 
Export sanctions 
If an export sanction is imposed, the total supply of goods in the target state goes down, 
indicated by a shift of the Supply curve to the left, now Supply*. This triggers several 
reactions; the first is that prices go up because of the lower supply. Higher prices mean that 
people will consume less, partly solving the problem of a lower supply. It also creates an 
incentive for domestic producers to produce more, and lastly, it explains why third states are 
willing to bust the sanctions: the higher prices mean there is a higher profit to be made. So 
not everyone is worse off, as far as domestic production can replace the lost imports, the 
domestic producers can make higher profits and so can the trade sector. The populace in the 
target state buying the composite good are the ones primarily paying the higher price.  
Figure 4. Demand and supply curve of export sanctions 
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Import sanctions 
With import sanctions, the Supply curve shifts to the right as indicated in figure 5. This time 
domestic producers in the target state cannot export their products to the sender state and 
are left with a surplus, leading to lower prices and thus probably some increased demand in 
the target state itself. Third countries might be willing to take over these exports for a lower 
price as long as it does not hurt their internal market. The commercial constituents in the 
target country are worse off this time, while the populace benefits from at least temporary 
lower prices.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Demand and supply curve of import sanctions 
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